

Discussion: Rational Inattention via Ignorance Equivalence

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Rational Inattention: Background

- Choice under costly information acquisition
 - ▶ Long history, goes back to Simon in 50's, Stigler in 60's
- **Rational Inattention:** [Sims (2003)]
 - ▶ Use concepts from *Information Theory*
 - ▶ Agents choose **structure and quantity** of info, e.g. noisy signals
 - ▶ Cost of acquiring info proportional to **informational gains**

$$\text{cost of info} = \lambda \times \underbrace{\text{Shannon's entropy}}_{\text{log distance btw prior and posterior}}$$

- Early applications in Macro (price-setting, portfolio choice...)
 - ▶ Limited due to difficulty
 - ▶ Special cases: Gaussian + Quadratic, static

Rational Inattention: Background (...)

- Renewed interest in Micro/Decision Theory/Behavioral
- **Discrete choice**
 - ▶ **Finite states:** $\omega \in \Omega$
 - ▶ **Discrete actions:** $\mathcal{A} = \{a_1, a_2, \dots, a_N\}$
 - ▶ **Preferences:** $u(a, \omega), \lambda$
- **Solution: Stochastic choice**
 - ▶ Choose directly probability over actions given state $\Pr(a|\omega)$
 - ▶ **Consideration set:** $\mathcal{B} = \{a | \Pr(a) > 0\} \subseteq \mathcal{A}$
 - Used in psychology (heuristics), marketing (“evoked” set)

Rational Inattention: Some Background (...)

- **Necessary Condition:** [Matejka & McKay, 2015]
 - ▶ **Multinomial logit:** “twist” mass towards most favorable outcomes

$$\Pr(a|\omega) = \frac{\Pr(a)e^{\frac{u(a,\omega)}{\lambda}}}{\sum_{a' \in \mathcal{B}} \Pr(a')e^{\frac{u(a',\omega)}{\lambda}}}, \quad \mathcal{B} \text{ exogenous}$$

- **Necessary + Sufficient Conditions:** [Caplin, Dean & Leahy, 2019]
 - ▶ Determine set of chosen/ignored actions
 - ▶ \mathcal{B} endogenous, determined by λ , u and prior beliefs
 - ▶ RI agents **reduce alternatives** before gathering information!
- **Continuous state** [Jung, et.al, 2015]
 - ▶ Even with continuous \mathcal{A} , consideration set \mathcal{B} is **lower dimensional!**

This Paper: Theory

- **Equivalence**

Rational Inattention (RI) \iff Geometric Attention Problem (GAP)

- **Key new concept:** Ignorance equivalent \tilde{a}


- ▶ Fictional alternative chosen unconditionally (blindly, no learning!)
- ▶ Analogous to **certainty equivalent**

- Exploit **simpler structure of GAP** and convex optimization to...


- ① Derive necessary and sufficient conditions for GAP
- ② Transform RI into EU maximization over modified menu
- ③ Tailor fast algorithm to estimate \mathcal{B} and bound its cardinality $\#(\mathcal{B})$

Application I: Matejka (2015)

- Pricing problem of RI monopolist under stochastic demand elasticity
- Monopolist puts positive probability only on few “reference” prices
- Proposed algorithm: Speed + Scalability



(a) GAP-SQP algorithm




(b) Blahut-Arimoto algorithm

Figure 4: Running times across grid precision

Application I: Matejka (2015)

- Where is the consideration set \mathcal{B} ?
- True solution lies within 95% cover \Rightarrow algorithm performs well




Application II: Jung *et.al.* (2019)


- Investor with CARA utility chooses portfolio weights $(\theta_0, \theta_1, \theta_2)$
 - ▶ one riskless asset
 - ▶ two risky assets (unlearnable + learnable noise)
- Jung *et. al.* show numerically (**but not analytically!**) that solution's support is finite
- New method yields **more points** than those found by Jung *et.al.*!
 - ▶ Consideration set looks like circle → action space may be **continuous**
 - ▶ Illustrates power of algorithm

Application II: Jung et. al (2019)

Solution in this example might be continuous!



(a) estimated portfolio choice




(b) partial covers

Application III: Task assignment

- New example to show application in environments with finite actions
- Manager allocates 10 workers across three tasks:
 - ▶ Task 0 is never critical (dismissal)
 - ▶ Task 1 or 2 may be critical (unknown to manager beforehand)
- Output determined by number of workers in critical task
 - ▶ One (unknown) slacker prevents others from producing
 - ▶ 20 states (2 potential critical tasks X 10 potential slackers)
 - ▶ Manager has 6124 potential assignments
- Numerically solution is...
 - ▶ Very rich, non-linear in information costs, multiple strategies

Application III: Task assignment

Solution to RI problems can be quite complex!



(a) Mean output (solid black) and information acquisition (dashed blue).

Comments and Questions

- Hard paper to read the first time.... and the second (after skimming literature)
 - ▶ Perhaps make paper more self-contained
- On the theory: Equivalence of RI to GAP very novel
 - ▶ Use of geometric intuition to tailor the algorithm is quite neat
- On the applications: can you explore dynamic settings?
 - ▶ Consumption-savings problem (Tutino, 2013)
 - ▶ Simple 2-period model (Sims, 2006)

Comments and Questions (...)

- Recent experimental evidence rejects Shannon's model

$$\log \left(\frac{P(\omega|a)}{P(\omega|b)} \right) = \frac{u(a, \omega) - u(b, \omega)}{\lambda}$$

- ▶ Linearity and symmetry are rejected [Caplin, Dean & Nellig]
-
- Literature proposes alternative “posterior-separable” cost functions
 - ▶ Does the equivalence $RI \iff GAP$ still hold under alternative costs?
 - ▶ Can the algorithm be extended to consider alternative costs?